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Abstract
This paper carries out an analysis of three main aspects that may apply to any
of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers
from the rst one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one
established in Lisbon. The procedure we show is mainly illustrated for the voting
systems for the European Union enlargement adopted in the Athens summit, held
in April 2003, but can be applied to any other.
First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in gen-
eral, reduce. Next, the egalitarian eects of superposing two or three weighted
majority games (often introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally,
the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.
Keywords: Voting systems, simple games, weighted majority games, Shapley{Shubik
power index, dimension, egalitarianism, decisiveness.
Math. Subj. Class. (2000): 91A12, 91A40, 91A80, 91B12, 91B74, 91F10.
1 Introduction
The successive enlargements undergone by the European Union raise many interesting
questions concerning not only politics but also the mechanisms used to make decisions.
Cooperative game theory, and more particularly simple games, provide suitable tools to
the analysis of some of them. Among the decision{making organisms of the Union, the
Council of Ministers appears, each time, as one of the main battleelds in the design of
the enlarged structure.
In this paper we are interested in the study of three main aspects of the sophisticated
voting rules that concern the Council of Ministers. These rules are dened by combining
in each case two or three elementary mechanisms (weighted majority games), giving
rise to much more complicated and restrictive ones. We will adopt here a normative
viewpoint, so that no strategic behavior of the involved countries will be assumed.
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First, we shall deal with the dimension of the simple games dening those voting rules and
the possibility to get a simplication of them. Second, we will focus on a delicate point,
especially since the agents are countries and not individual people: the egalitarianism
level of those rules rather than the specic fraction of power they allocate in the Council
to each one of the countries that will form the future Union. Third, we will evaluate the
(structural) decisiveness the rules show as decision{making procedures, given that their
structure suggests a strong inertial component. In all cases, the eect of the imposed
restrictions will be of our main interest.
The three aspects, which are object of analysis in this work, complement many others
treated in several references, among them: Bertini et al. [1, 2], Chakravarty et al. [7],
Freixas and Pons [14], Freixas et al. [18], Freixas and Gambarelli [16], Gambarelli [20, 21]
or Owen [28].
The organization of the work is then as follows. In Section 2, technical preliminaries
concerning the three points of our research are given. Section 3 provides a summary of
the voting rules adopted in Athens and the corresponding simple games. Section 4 is
devoted to the study of the dimension. Section 5 refers to the egalitarianism. Section 6
deals with decisiveness. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, in order to make a self-contained work, we recall some basic denitions
and properties about simple games, dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness.
2.1 Simple games
Denition 2.1 A (monotonic) simple game is a pair (N; v) where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is
a nite set of players, every S  N is a coalition, 2N is the set of all coalitions, and
v : 2N ! f0; 1g is the characteristic function, which satises v(;) = 0, v(N) = 1, and
v(S)  v(T ) if S  T  N: A coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. If
W denotes the set of winning coalitions in v, then ; =2W; N 2W , and T 2W whenever
S  T  N and S 2W . A coalition S is blocking if S;N   S =2W . Wherever N will be
clearly xed, we will abuse the notation and speak, simply, of \game v". For additional
material on simple games, the reader is referred to Shapley [31], Carreras and Freixas [5],
Taylor and Zwicker [36] and Carreras [3].
Denition 2.2 A simple game (N; v) is a weighted majority game (WMG, for short) if
there are nonnegative weights w1; : : : ; wn attached to the players and a positive quota
q  wN such that
v(S) =

1 if wS  q;
0 if wS < q;
where wS =
P
i2S wi for every S  N . We then write (N; v) = [q;w1; : : : ; wn]. It is
well known that only for n  3 every simple game is a WMG. In the sequel, we will
always assume that w1      wn and, in case of having dierent weights w1 >    > wr
repeated k1; : : : ; kr times respectively (so that k1 +    + kr = n), we will often write
(N; v) = [q;w1(k1); : : : ; wr(kr)] for short. In particular, a k{out{of{n game is a special
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case of WMG: in fact, the expression \k{out{of{n" refers to the description of the game
in which each one of the n players is given a weight of 1 and the quota is set at k, i.e.
(N; v) = [k; 1(n)].
Taylor and Zwicker [34] established that, among simple games, the WMGs are precisely
those where winningness is \robust" with respect to general trades.
Denition 2.3 A simple game (N; v) is k{trade robust for some positive integer k if there
is no exchange of members among any collection of j  k winning coalitions R1; : : : ; Rj
that leads to losing coalitions T1; : : : ; Tj in such a way that
jfp : i 2 Rpgj = jfp : i 2 Tpgj for each i 2 N:
A simple game is trade robust if it is k{trade robust for all k.
For instance, if N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and v is the simple game in which the winning coalitions
are: R1 = f1; 2g and R2 = f3; 4g plus those extended by monotonicity, it follows then
that both T1 = f1; 3g and T2 = f2; 4g are losing and can be obtained from R1 and R2 by
swapping in them players 2 and 3. Thus this game is not 2{trade robust and therefore
it is not weighted.
Theorem 2.4 ([34]) A simple game is a WMG if and only if it is trade robust. 
2.2 Dimension
The following notion was introduced for graphs in the late 1970s; its extension to hyper-
graphs (equivalent to simple but not necessarily monotonic games) is due to Jereslow [23].
Nevertheless, the denition of dimension for simple games is reminiscent of the dimension
of a partially ordered set as the minimum number of linear orderings whose intersection
is the given partial ordering (see Dushnik and Miller [11]).
Denition 2.5 The dimension of a simple game (N; v) is the least k for which there
exist k WMGs (N; v1); : : : ; (N; vk) such that
v = v1 \    \ vk:
Theorem 2.6 (See, for example, [33] or [35]) Every simple game has a dimension, and
it is bounded by the number of maximal losing coalitions of the game. 
The dimension of a simple game can be seen as a measure of its complexity. In the
books by Taylor [33] and Taylor and Zwicker [35], the authors deal with dimension
theory for simple games; in Freixas and Puente [15], the dimensions of several types
of composite games are computed. Most real voting systems are described by simple
games of dimension one or two: the United Nations Security Council is of dimension 1,
and interesting examples of dimension 2 are the United States federal system (see, for
instance, Taylor [33]) and the Victoria Proposal, the procedure to amend the Canadian
Constitution (see Kilgour [24] and Taylor [33]).
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2.3 Linear games and egalitarianism
Denition 2.7 The individual desirability relation D, introduced by Isbell [22] and gen-
eralized later on by Maschler and Peleg [26], is the partial preorder on the player set N
dened, for each game v on N , by iDj in v if and only if v(S [ fig)  v(S [ fjg) for
every S  N   fi; jg.
Denition 2.8 Games for which D is complete (or total, i.e. satisfying that for every
i; j 2 N either iDj or jDi or both) have been given various names in the literature
(ordered, complete); we will refer to them here as linear games. It is clear that every
WMG is linear, but for any n  6 there are linear games that are not WMGs. In the
sequel, when considering linear games, we will always assume 1D2, 2D3, : : : , (n  1)Dn.
For a characterization of any linear simple game in terms of numerical invariants, the
reader is referred to [5].
Denition 2.9 A simple game v on N is a linear game with consensus if
v = u \ [q; 1(n)];
where u is a simple game on N such that v becomes linear. This notion, introduced
in [6], is slightly more general than the one considered by Peleg [29].
Notice that u is not asked to be linear. If iDj in u then iDj in v, but the converse is not
true. From the fact that every WMG is linear, it follows that if u is a WMG then v is a
linear game with consensus. Furthermore, if u is the intersection of two WMGs u1 and
u2 and the weights respectively dening them satisfy wki  wki+1 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n   1
and k = 1; 2 (as mentioned in Denition 2.2), then u is linear and v becomes a linear
game with consensus. This is especially important for the voting systems we will study
below.
Denition 2.10 The well{known Shapley{Shubik index of power, introduced in [32] (see
also [30]), is the allocation rule that assigns to every simple game (N; v) the n{vector
[v] = (1[v]; : : : ;n[v]) dened by
i[v] =
X
SN :S3i
n(s)[v(S)  v(S   fig)] for each i 2 N;
where s = jSj and n(s) = (s  1)!(n  s)!
n!
. It is worth mentioning the axiomatic
characterization of this allocation rule by means of eciency, symmetry, null player and
transfer properties stated by Dubey [10]. And also the interpretation provided by Shapley
and Shubik: i[v] is the probability of player i to be pivotal when all permutations of
players are equally likely (player i = k is pivotal in permutation  = (1; : : : ; n) for
game v if f1; : : : ; kg is winning in v but f1; : : : ; k 1g is not).
Denition 2.11 A n{vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn) Lorenz{dominates y = (y1; : : : ; yn) ifPn
i=j xi 
Pn
i=j yi for j = 1; : : : ; n. In symbols, xLy.
Let u be a linear game on N , v1 = u \ [q1; 1(n)] and v2 = u \ [q2; 1(n)], with 1 
q1 < q2  n. Peleg [29] proved that [v2] L [v1] (see also [39]). From eciency and
Lorenz{domination, it follows that
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(i) 1[v
1]  1[v2] and
(ii) n[v
2]  n[v1].
(For any other player i 6= 1; n, there are no valid inequalities like (i) or (ii); for de-
tails, see Proposition 3.1 in [6].) This can be interpreted as reecting that, from the
Shapley{Shubik index viewpoint, game v2 is more \egalitarian" than v1, in the sense
that
1[v
1]  n[v1]  1[v2]  n[v2]:
To cope with this idea, we introduce some notions.
Denition 2.12 Let (N; v) be a linear simple game.
(a) The range of (N; v) is the range of the set of numbers 1[v]; : : : ;n[v], i.e.
rang [v] = 1[v]  n[v]:
(b) The egalitarianism of (N; v) is
egal [v] = 1=rang [v]:
Notice that 1  egal [v]  1 for all v. In fact, egal [v] = 1 i v is a dictatorship and
egal [v] =1 i v is a k{out{of{n game. We will be interested in the study of the increase
of egalitarianism when passing from a linear game with consensus v1 to another linear
game with a higher level of consensus v2. The over{egalitarianism percentage, dened
by
oep [v1; v2] =
egal [v2]  egal [v1]
egal [v1]
 100;
reects this increase. The denition makes sense unless v1 is a k{out{of{n game. In
this case, v2 would also be a k0{out{of{n game, and we could take oep [v1; v2] = 0 as a
convention.
At this point we recall from [6] a main result to be used below.
Theorem 2.13 ([6]) Let v1 = u\ [q1; 1(n)] and v2 = u\ [q2; 1(n)] be linear games with
consensus with 1  q1 < q2  n. Then:
(a) 0  1[v1]  1[v2]  q2   q1
n
.
(b) 0  n[v2]  n[v1]  1
n
. 
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2.4 Structural decisiveness
Let us nally refer to the decisiveness notion, introduced in [4] (see also [9]). As the real
life experience shows, two main tendencies arise in the design of voting systems. The rst
one tries to strengthen the agility of the mechanism in order to take decisions, and usually
applies to national and regional parliaments, town councils, and many other committee
systems. The second tendency is rather interested in protecting the rights of certain
minorities, even at the cost of introducing a remarkable inertia in the mechanism, and is
especially found in supranational organizations. It seems therefore interesting to measure,
and of course to compare, the agility/inertia of these decision{making procedures, and
the decisiveness index is intended to this end.
Denition 2.14 ([4]) The (structural) decisiveness index is the map that assigns to
every simple game (N; v) the number
(N; v) = 2 njW j:
Number (N; v), or simply [v], will be called the decisiveness degree of game (N; v).
If f is the multilinear extension of game v (see [27]), then [v] = f(1/2; : : : ; 1/2). Thus,
[v] merely gives the probability of a proposal to be socially accepted by N under the
acceptance rules stated by v when each agent has an independent probability of 1/2 to
vote for it. Nevertheless, it is precisely this formal approach, that does not take into
account any strategic behavior of the players, the best suited tool to analyze voting
systems from just a structural viewpoint.
The decisiveness index is a normalized measure, as 0 < [v] < 1 for any simple game
v. More precisely, for a given N the minimum decisiveness degree is attained on the
unanimity game uN (where N is the only winning coalition) and is [uN ] = 2
 n, whereas
the maximum degree is attained on the individualistic game uN
 (the dual game of uN ,
where any S 6= ; is winning) and is [uN ] = 1  2 n. Notice that all so{called decisive
games (that is, those where S 2W i N  S =2W ) show a decisiveness degree of 1/2. In
general, all proper (i.e. superadditive simple) games have a degree less than, or equal to,
1/2. The less is [v], the more dicult is to take decisions in v. For the main properties
of the decisiveness index, especially referring to the usual ways to combine simple games,
several axiomatic characterizations, and an alternative computation procedure, we refer
the interested reader to [4].
3 Provisions of the Accession Treaty on voting in the
Council
As was pointed out in the rst part of this work the normative methodology proposed
may be used for any binary voting system or simple game resulting from the intersection
of at least two WMGs. Dimension and consensus become then interesting issues to be
analyzed, while decisiveness applies to all simple games, no matter if they decompose or
not as the intersection of two or more WMGs.
6
As Taylor [33] noted in his book on Mathematics and Politics: \the interest of dimension
lies on the fact that all known voting simple games in practice have small dimension:
either one or two." This observation makes dimension a very interesting notion since a
dimensionally ecient representation is a compact, intuitive and simple way to represent
almost all real voting simple games.
Two voting systems of the European Union Council under the Nice rules, that entered in
eect on February 1st 2003, became the rst known real-world examples of dimension 3,
see Freixas [13]. Other real-world examples with dimension 3 appeared later on. Indeed,
Cheung and Ng [8] proved that the voting system in Hong Kong, which is not a complete
simple game, has also dimension 3. Kurz and Napel [25], have proven that the Lisbon
voting system of the Council of the European Union, which became eective in November
2014, cannot be represented as the intersection of six or fewer weighted games, i.e., its
dimension is at least 7 and determination of the exact dimension is posed as a challenge
to the community. This sets a new record for real-world voting bodies.
The Athens treaty was signed on April 16th 2003 in Athens, Greece and came into force
on May 1st 2004, the day of the enlargement of the European Union. It modied a
signicant number of points that originally dealt with the Treaty of Nice. This treaty,
chronologically situated between the treaties of Nice and Lisbon, will be taken as the
basis for theoretical discussions we follow in this work.
The Athens Treaty amended the system of qualied majority voting to apply from 2004.
We regard rules on two dierent scenarios for enlargement: the transitional period and
the period from November 1st 2004. For each assumed scenario, a WMG is at the core
of the system but some additional conditions which must also be met have been added,
in terms of the number of countries and, in some cases, population.
Using proper terminology of game theory, the players are:
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland,
The Netherlands, Greece, Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal,
Sweden, Austria, Slovak Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta;
which we will represent by the set f1; 2; : : : ; 25g where 1 stands for Germany, 2 stands
for the United Kingdom, and so on.
3.1 Transitional period: May 1st 2004 | October 31st 2004
We quote the relevant text from [37], article 26.
For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least:
(1) 88 votes in favour (of a total of 124 votes) where this Treaty requires to
be adopted on a proposal from the Commission,
(2) 88 votes in favour (of a total of 124 votes), cast by at least two-thirds of
the members, in other cases.
In the event that fewer than ten new Member States accede to the Union,
the threshold for the qualied majority for the period until October 31st 2004
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shall be xed by Council decision so as to correspond as closely as possible to
71.26% of the total number of votes.
The rst game
u1 = [88; 10(4); 8(2); 5(6); 4(2); 3(8); 2(3)] (1)
corresponds to a given vote distribution among countries and a majority of a 70.97%, i.e.
a threshold for the qualied majority as closely as possible to 71.26%. Let v1 = [13; 1(25)]
and v2 = [17; 1(25)] be the games that respectively correspond to a simple majority and
a two-thirds majority of the members. Notice that u1 \ v1 = u1. The second game is
u2 = u1 \ v2: (2)
3.2 From November 1st 2004
We quote the relevant text from [37], article 12.
Acts of the Council shall require for their adoption at least 232 votes in
favour cast by a majority of the members where this Treaty requires them
to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission.
In other cases, for their adoption acts of the Council shall require at least 232
votes in favour, cast by at least two-thirds of the members.
When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualied majority, a
member of the Council may request verication that the Member States con-
stituting the qualied majority represent at least 62% of the total population
of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the decision
in question shall not be adopted.
In the event of fewer than ten new Member States acceding to the European
Union, the threshold for the qualied majority shall be xed by Council de-
cision by applying a strictly linear, arithmetical interpolation, rounded up or
down to the nearest vote, between 71% for a Council with 300 votes and the
level of 72.27% for an European Union of 25 Member States.
The rst game is
v3 = [232; 29(4); 27(2); 13(1); 12(5); 10(2); 7(5); 4(5); 3(1)]:
Let
v4 = [620; 182; 132; 131; 128; 87; 86; 35; 23(3); 22(2); 20; 18; 12(2); 11; 8(2); 5; 4; 3; 2; 1(2)];
where weights are proportional to populations and a majority of a 62% is demanded.
The voting systems to be used will correspond to
u3 = v3 \ v4 \ v1 (3)
and
u4 = v3 \ v4 \ v2: (4)
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Systems (3) and (4) should therefore be thought of as requiring triple majorities: (a)
weights must meet or exceed the threshold (a super{majority t 72:27% of the account);
(b) a super{majority of 62% of the count per population with weights and quota based
on the rate per thousand; and (c) either the simple majority of the count per country or
a super{majority of 2=3 of it.
In this model, we assume that the planned referenda will allow all the new 10 countries
to access to the European Union.
The two Athens rules from November 1st 2004 we deal with here, u3 and u4, require
the agreement of three sorts of majorities. Among other results, we shall prove that the
notable complexity of both systems is irreducible, thus providing the existence of real
voting systems of dimension three. As for the rule u2; for the transitional period, we will
also prove that the system is irreducible.
4 On the dimension of the Council
In this section we prove that the dimension of u2 is two and the dimension of u3 and u4
is three and, therefore, none of these games can be described using less WMGs. Similar
calculations were already done in Freixas [13] for the enlargement to 27 members initially
foreseen, agreed in December 2000 in the summit of Nice.
For variants, e.g., the notion of codimension and theoretical background on the notion
of dimension, we refer the reader to Freixas and Marciniak [17].
4.1 The dimension for the transitional period
Theorem 4.1 The dimension of game u2 is 2:
Proof. Obviously, the dimension of u2 = u1 \ v2 is at most 2. If i  j in N , let us denote
[i; j] = fk 2 N : i  k  jg. Consider the following coalitions: A = [5; 25], B = [1; 16],
A0 = A  f24; 25g [ f4g and B0 = B   f4g [ f24; 25g: The weights of these coalitions in
games u1 and v2 are stated in the next table:
A B A0 B0
u1 84 100 90 94
v2 21 16 20 17
Assume now that u2 has dimension 1, i.e. that u2 is a WMG. Coalition A is losing in u1
and B is losing in v2 and, hence, both coalitions are losing in u2. But, after trades, A
and B convert into the winning coalitions A0 and B0. Consequently, game u2 cannot be
a WMG according to Theorem 2.4. 
4.2 The dimension from November 1st 2004
Theorem 4.2 The dimension of game u3 is 3.
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Proof. Being u3 = v3 \ v4 \ v1, its dimension is at most 3. Consider the following
coalitions:
 A = [1; 3] [ [7; 23], B = [1; 12] and C = f1g [ [5; 25].
 A0 = A f13; 20; 21g[f4g, B0 = B f4g[f13; 20; 21g and C 0 = C f5; 25g[f3g.
 A00 = A  f3g [ f5; 25g, B00 = B   f2g [ f13; 14g and C 00 = C   f13; 14g [ f2g.
The weights of these coalitions in games v1, v3 and v4 are stated in the next table:
A B C A0 B0 C 0 A00 B00 C 00
v1 20 12 22 18 14 21 21 13 21
v3 231 243 234 242 232 233 232 234 243
v4 696 894 608 795 795 651 653 800 702
Assume rst that u3 has dimension 1. Coalition A is losing in v3 and so is B in v1;
consequently, A and B are losing in u3. But, after trades, A and B convert into A
0 and
B0 that are both winning in u3.
Assume now that u3 has dimension 2, i.e. it can be set as the intersection of two WMGs.
Then, at least one of the following statements should be true:
(a) A and B are losing in the same WMG.
(b) A and C are losing in the same WMG.
(c) B and C are losing in the same WMG.
Statement (a) cannot be true because, as we have seen above, A0 and B0 are both winning
in u3, which is not possible in a WMG.
Statement (b) is impossible because A00 and C 0 are both winning in v3, v1 and v4 and,
then, coalitions A, C, A00 and C 0 show a failure for trade robustness.
Finally, statement (c) is impossible for the same reason by considering coalitions B, C,
B00 and C 00. 
Theorem 4.3 The dimension of game u4 is 3.
Proof. This proof follows the same guidelines as those of Theorem 4.2. For the sake of
completeness, we indicate the coalitions we use to make trades and their corresponding
weights in games v2, v3 and v4:
 A = [1; 2] [ [4; 5] [ [7; 12] [ [16; 23], B = [1; 16] and C = [2; 3] [ [6; 25].
 A0 = A  f22; 23g [ f3g, B0 = B   f3g [ f22; 23g and C 0 = C   f6; 25g [ f4g.
 A00 = A  f4g [ f6; 25g, B00 = B   f1g [ f24; 25g and C 00 = C   f24; 25g [ f1g.
A B C A0 B0 C 0 A00 B00 C 00
v2 18 16 22 17 17 21 19 17 21
v3 231 277 236 252 256 235 232 255 258
v4 730 956 602 856 830 643 689 776 782

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4.3 Two surprising facts about the dimension of the Council
Let us analize the initial enlargement for the European Union planned in the summit of
Nice. There, 27 countries were supposed to form the future EU: the countries considered
in Athens with the addition of Romania and Bulgaria. These two countries were assigned
14 and 10 votes in the Council, respectively. The 25 other countries were assigned the
same number of votes as in game v3.
We quote the relevant text from [38], p. 164.
Acts of the Council shall require for their adoption at least 258 votes in favour,
cast by a majority of members, where this Treaty requires them to be adopted
on a proposal from the Commission.
[...] When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualied majority, a
member of the Council may request verication that the Members States con-
stituting the qualied majority represent at least 62% of the total population
of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the decision
in question shall not be adopted.
If we consider N = f1; 2; : : : ; 27g and games
v1 = [14; 1(27)];
v3 = [258; 29(4); 27(2); 14(1); 13(1); 12(5); 10(3); 7(5); 4(5); 3(1)]; and
v4 = [620; 170; 123(2); 120; 82; 80; 47; 33; 22; 21(4); 18; 17(2); 11(3); 8(2); 5; 4; 3; 2; 1(2)];
then, the game that represents the full rules is u = v3 \ v4 \ v1 (notice that the rate per
thousand has changed from v4 to v
4 when including both new countries).
For simplicity, we assume that no relevant population changes have occurred since then
on. Notice that the threshold of 258 implies a super{majority of 74:78%, which is quite
high and, therefore, it is rather dicult to reach agreements. Game u reduces to a single
WMG (see Felsenthal and Machover [12]), so that its dimension is 1.
Assume for a while that some States (Romania and Bulgaria) delay their incorporation
to the EU but the rate between the threshold and the sum of weights used in each one of
the three games is not modied: 50:01% for game v1, 74:78% for v3 and 62% for v4. This
means that the spirit of the rule is maintained. How does the reduction of the number
of countries aect the dimension? Will the dimension of this game with two less players
be necessarily 1 or, instead, can it be greater than 1?
Notice that, in general, if a simple game has dimension k, i.e. it is expressed as an
intersection of k WMGs, and some players are removed but the threshold is left invariant
in each WMG, then the dimension of the reduced game is at most k. However, we will
see that the dimension of the reduced game may be greater than k if the thresholds are
modied in order to preserve the proportion with the sum of weights for each one of the
WMGs. Game u will help us to show this fact.
Let us consider, for the 25 Member States, game
u0 = (v3)0 \ v4 \ v1;
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wherein (v3)0 = [240; 29(4); 27(2); 13(1); 12(5); 10(2); 7(5); 4(5); 3(1)] and v1 and v4 are
the games we were already using in Section 3.
Game u0 represents the reduction of u in the way we mentioned above. In fact, the
threshold for the 25{game (v3)0, 240, is in proportion of 100240321 = 74:77%, and this rate
almost coincides with that of the 27{game v3. Games v1 and v4 have rates that almost
coincide also with those of games v1 and v4. The rst rather surprising fact is shown in
the next result.
Theorem 4.4 The dimension of game u0 is 2.
Proof. It comes on from the following properties:
(a) Each winning coalition in (v3)0 is also winning in v4, i.e. (v3)0 \ v4 = (v3)0 and
hence u0 = (v3)0 \ v1.
(b) (v3)0 \ v1 does not reduce to a single WMG.
To see property (a) it suces to check that if S is a coalition with a weight lower than
82 in (v3)0 then its weight in v4 is lower than 380, and this allows us to considerably
reduce the number of coalitions to examine to 106 relevant models (of course we omit
this tedious but easy part). Then, (v3)0 \ v4 = (v3)0.
Property (b) follows from the fact that coalitions A = [1; 3] [ [7; 25] and B = [1; 12]
are both losing in u0 but, after trades, convert into the winning coalitions A0 = A  
f13; 14; 24g [ f6g and B0 = B   f6g [ f13; 14; 24g. This proves that u0 = (v3)0 \ v1 does
not reduce to a WMG. 
Let us explain now a second surprising fact that might happen. If we consider that sig-
nicant changes in the population are possible, imagine for instance that the population
of each State tends to be proportional to the weight assigned to this State in the original
weighted game; then it will be possible that the weight{votes game and the population
game are the same WMG. In consequence, if population changes, it is theoretically pos-
sible to reach a game with the same Member States but with less dimension than the
original one.
In conclusion, the behavior of the dimension is sensitive to either the addition/suppression
of members or small changes in the population percentages. Therefore, eventual reduc-
tions of the dimension hardly justify simplication on the voting mechanisms intended
for the Council.
5 On the egalitarianism of the Council
In this section we are interested in the eect of requiring consensus in the voting systems
planned for the enlargement to 25 members of the EU. We will quantify the egalitarianism
of each voting system and how much does it change when the level of consensus increases.
As in Section 3, we study separately both foreseen scenarios. Three works dealing with
the issue of egalitarianism are: Peleg [29], Carreras and Freixas [6] and Freixas and
Marciniak [19].
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5.1 On the eect of consensus for the transitional period
Recall that game u1 represents the basic WMG to be applied for a proposal coming from
the European Commission (if straight majority is also required, u1 does not change:
u1 = u1 \ v1), and u2 is the same game but with a consensus of 2/3 (u2 = u1 \ v2): it
applies for motions not coming from the European Commission.
Table 1 shows the power distribution, according to the Shapley{Shubik index of power,
and the egalitarianism for games u1 and u2. The players are represented by their weights
and the power is rounded to four decimal places.
Table 1 Power distribution and egalitarianism for the transitional period.
Weight i[u1] i[u2]
10 0:0830 0:0759
8 0:0651 0:0602
5 0:0397 0:0391
4 0:0325 0:0337
3 0:0234 0:0265
2 0:0157 0:0207
Egalitarianism 14:8588 18:1159
As intuition could predict, the higher level of consensus in game u2 makes it more egali-
tarian than u1. The over{egalitarianism percentage quanties how much more:
oep [u1; u2] = 21:92%:
Notice that the loss of Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy (the main players)
is of 0:0071, while the gain of Malta (the weakest player) is of 0:0050. According to
Theorem 2.13, these two quantities could have reached 0:1600 and 0:0400, respectively.
5.2 On the eect of consensus from November 1st 2004
Table 2 shows the power distribution among the players for the most interesting games
involved in the rules of the voting systems from November 1st 2004. Again, players are
represented by their weights, but now the Shapley{Shubik index of power is rounded to
six decimal places because, if only four decimals were taken, certain dierences on power
that really exist would appear to be zero for some non{equivalent players.
Table 2 Power distribution and egalitarianism from November 1st 2004.
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Population Weight i[v4] i[v3] i[v4 \ v3] i[u3] i[u4]
182 29 0:197955 0:092926 0:094941 0:094930 0:085770
132 29 0:134660 0:092926 0:093708 0:093698 0:084537
131 29 0:133462 0:092926 0:093704 0:093693 0:084532
128 29 0:129934 0:092926 0:093694 0:093683 0:084523
87 27 0:085358 0:086136 0:086715 0:086705 0:078377
86 27 0:084452 0:086136 0:086715 0:086705 0:078377
35 13 0:033029 0:039829 0:039515 0:039511 0:038448
23 12 0:021359 0:036479 0:036142 0:036138 0:035901
23 12 0:021359 0:036479 0:036142 0:036138 0:035901
23 12 0:021359 0:036479 0:036142 0:036138 0:035901
22 12 0:020384 0:036479 0:036142 0:036138 0:035901
22 12 0:020384 0:036479 0:036142 0:036138 0:035901
20 10 0:018452 0:030241 0:029926 0:029927 0:031159
18 10 0:016505 0:030241 0:029903 0:029904 0:031135
12 7 0:011085 0:020984 0:020655 0:020662 0:024126
12 7 0:011085 0:020984 0:020655 0:020662 0:024126
11 7 0:010137 0:020984 0:020651 0:020657 0:024121
8 7 0:007297 0:020984 0:020646 0:020652 0:024116
8 7 0:007297 0:020984 0:020646 0:020652 0:024116
5 4 0:004468 0:011892 0:011695 0:011704 0:017524
4 4 0:003615 0:011892 0:011695 0:011704 0:017524
3 4 0:002723 0:011892 0:011695 0:011704 0:017524
2 4 0:001819 0:011892 0:011695 0:011704 0:017524
1 4 0:000911 0:011892 0:011695 0:011704 0:017524
1 3 0:000911 0:008938 0:008741 0:008750 0:015410
Egalitarianism 5:0750 11:9065 11:6009 11:6036 14:2126
Let's rst refer to games v4 (population game) and v3 (weight game). The egalitarianism
of game v4, given by egal [v4] = 5:0750, reects the great power dierence between the
main and the weakest players. Game v3 is more egalitarian, since egal [v3] = 11:9065.
Note that there is an increase of a 134:61% in egalitarianism when passing from v4 to v3.
If we cross v3 and v4, we check that v4 is highly aected by v3, as egal [v4\v3] = 11:6009;
nevertheless, the meet of v4 to v3 is somewhat supercial since the egalitarianism of v3
remains almost invariant when intersecting with v4.
We also realize that the requirement of majority by means of v1 is nearly negligible
because egal [u3] = 11:6036. In fact, the weight game v3 is more egalitarian than the one
obtained when there are also population and majority requirements.
The demand of a 2/3{consensus changes the situation a little bit. In this case we get the
higher level of egalitarianism, given that egal [u4] = 14:2126, which represents an increase
of a 22:48% with respect to u3. As shown in Table 2, there are appraisable modications
in the players' power with respect to the other games.
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6 On the decisiveness of the Council
We nally analyze the (structural) decisiveness of the dierent voting systems involved
in the Council's decision{making procedures. All games are proper (i.e., do not contain
disjoint winning coalitions) and most of them are weak (i.e., admit blocking coalitions).
As a matter of comparison, we notice that the precedent 15{member voting systems of
the Council show decisiveness degrees of 0.0778 and 0.0704 depending on whether the
proposal at stake comes from the European Commission or not (for details, see [4]).
Table 3 below displays the decisiveness degrees of several games. Among them we have
included games v1, v2, u1, u2, v3, v4, u3, u4 and some combinations of these, as well as
the unanimity game uN for n = jN j = 25, which gives the minimum degree, and games
u01, v
0
3 and v
0
4 that correspond to u1, v3 and v4 by replacing the qualied majority with
the straight one.
Table 4 oers the percentage of decisiveness loss found when passing from a given game
(to be found in the upper row) to a less decisive one (to be found in the left column).
Jointly with those of Table 3, its results will be the basis for our subsequent comments.
6.1 Decisiveness for the transitional period
Although the decisiveness degrees of games u1 and u2 are far from the minimum (attained
by uN ), they are less than 1/2 of those corresponding to the precedent Council. The
decrease seems hard to be justied by the provisional nature of the transitional period.
Incidentally, notice that using the straight majority game u01 instead of u1 would take
the decisiveness degree to 0.4863, while the maximum for proper games is 0.5 (as, for
example, in game v1): the dierence is due to the fact that u
0
1 admits blocking coalitions
Table 3 Decisiveness degree of several games.
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Game Description Structural
(when necessary) decisiveness
uN unanimity game 3:10
 8 (minimum)
v1 transitional 1/2{majority 0.5000 (maximum)
v2 transitional 2/3{majority 0.0539
u1 = u1 \ v1 transitional qualied majority 0.0349
u2 = u1 \ v2 transit. qualif. majority + 0.0259
2/3{majority
v3 qualied majority of weights 0.0359
v4 qualied majority of population 0.2397
v3 \ v1 0.0359
v3 \ v2 0.0222
v4 \ v1 0.1988
v4 \ v2 0.0404
v3 \ v4 0.0359
u3 = v3 \ v4 \ v1 0.0359
u4 = v3 \ v4 \ v2 0.0222
u01 straight majority on transit. weights 0.4863
v03 straight majority on weights 0.5000
v04 straight majority on population 0.5000
Table 4 Percentages of loss in decisiveness.
v1 u
0
1 u1 v
0
3 v
0
4 v3 v4 v3 \ v4 u3
v2 89%
u1 = u1 \ v1 93%
u2 = u1 \ v2 26%
v3 93%
v4 52%
v3 \ v1 0%
v3 \ v2 38%
v4 \ v1 17%
v4 \ v2 83%
v3 \ v4 0% 85%
u3 = v3 \ v4 \ v1 0% 85% 0%
u4 = v3 \ v4 \ v2 38% 91% 38% 38%
since the total number of votes is even. The percentage of loss when passing from u01 to
u1 is of a 93%.
When comparing the two real procedures, given by u1 and u2, we should rst notice that
the passing from v1 to v2 implies a loss of a 89%. However, the passing from u1 = u1\v1
to u2 = u1 \ v2 gives a loss of a 26% only, so that the negative eect on decisiveness
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derived from the imposition of the additional 2/3{consensus could be considered, after
all, quite reasonable.
6.2 Decisiveness from November 1st 2004
We rst note that the very low degree derived from imposing qualied majority on
weights (game v3) represents a loss of a 93% with regard to the straight majority game
v03. Instead, the qualied majority on population (game v4) gives rise to an interesting
degree of 0.2397 and hence to a clearly smaller loss of a 52% with regard to the straight
majority game v04.
Among the intermediate intersections v3 \ v1, v3 \ v2, v4 \ v1, v4 \ v2 and v3 \ v4, only
v4 \ v1 presents a degree clearly greater than the others (0.1988), whith a loss of a 17%
with respect to v4. Especially striking are the losses of v4 \ v2 and v3 \ v4 from v4 (83%
and 85%, respectively).
The actual procedures u3 and u4 are also interesting to analyze. First, their decisiveness
degrees are again very small and hardly get 1/2 of the corresponding prececdent proce-
dures. Thus, the enlarged Union does not seem designed to be especially eective in the
decision{making processes. The equalities
[u3] = [v3] = [v3 \ v4] = [v3 \ v1] = 0:0359
are also worth of mentioning, and they mean that intersections often cause no loss of
decisiveness. Finally, u3 (resp., u4) implies a loss of a 85% (resp., 91%) with respect to
v4, whereas the loss of u4 with respect to v3, v3 \ v4 and u3 is of a 38%.
7 Conclusions
Several features of the voting rules adopted in the Athens summit for the Council of
Ministers of the European Union have been analyzed here. We have studied, from a
strictly normative viewpoint, dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness. Two periods
have been considered in each case: the transitional one (until October 31st 2004) and
the denitive one (from November 1st 2004).
As to dimension, one of the transitional voting rules has been found to be of dimension
2, as its denition suggests, but the other reduces to a one{dimensional game (i.e. a
WMG). Instead, both rules of the denitive period are shown to be of dimension 3 and
provide, therefore, real voting systems of this dimension (not easy to nd). A rather
surprising fact is also stated, namely possible changes of dimension in two cases: the
rst by either the addition or suppression of countries but maintaining the proportion
between the quota and the total weight, and the second by population evolution. We
conclude that dimension is a very sensitive notion, and hence eventual changes of its
value do not justify simplication of the voting mechanisms.
With regard to egalitarianism, for the transitional period we nd that increasing the
consensus condition implies, of course, increasing the egalitarianism of the rule, but the
dierence is not especially relevant. And only the power of the four main countries
and the single minor one changes appreciably with the consensus increase. Things seem
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therefore balanced enough for this period. Instead, in the denitive period, v3 is much
more egalitarian than v4; intersecting them, there is a great increase of egalitarianism
with respect to v4 and a small decrease with respect to v3; and a further intersection
with v1 does not aect the egalitarianism, whereas intersecting with v2 clearly increases
this characteristic. In general, there are noticeable dierences in individual power only
between game v4 and the other games: v3, v4 \ v3, u3 and u4.
Finally, in what concerns decisiveness, in the transitional period we nd very low degrees,
even less than 1/2 of the degrees of the precedent 15{member Union rules (already very
low). The increase of consensus implies a decisiveness loss of a 26%. From November 1st
2004, the decisiveness of the corresponding rules decreases again. Only v4 shows a nice
degree of 0.2397, but there are drastic losses for u3 and u4 with regard to that population
game. When intersecting, game v1 does not aect the degree of v3 \ v4, but there is a
decrease if game v2 occurs. The loss from u3 to u4 is of a 38%. In our opinion, if the
voting procedures intended for the European Union Council of Ministers have to be really
useful for taking decisions, then the best games for the denitive period would be v4 \ v1
and v4 \ v2. The Athens rules should then have deserved a new, sound analysis and
maybe a modication from the part of the European Union. Notice that our conclusion
ts well the proposal contained in the rst draft of the European Constitution.
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